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Slave Law in the Americas. By Alan Watson. (Athens and London: University of
Georgia Press, 1990. Pp. xv, 179. Notes, index. $25.)
Alan Watson is a distinguished Roman law scholar who has written extensively
on the way in which legal systems borrow from other legal systems. In this slim
volume he examines the influence of Roman law on the laws of slavery in the
Americas, concluding that the Roman law heritage of the civil-law countries
accounts for the m~or differences between the laws of slavery in Latin America
and English America.
,
While acknowledging the impact on legal development of social, economic,
political and religious factors, Professor Watson contends that the law has a large
measure of autonomy. Thus similar laws may exist under quite different social and
economic circumstances. "[T]he government is usually uninterested in the precise
nature of most of the legal rules in operation." (p. 1 ). Legal rules are made largely
by a legal elite-jurists in Roman law, professors in the civil law and judges in the
common law systems. They use "legal logic" rather than directly examining the
needs of tl1e society. One aspect of tl1at logic is borrowing-either using analogy
within a legal system or taking from another legal system with high prestige. In
that fashion the slave law of Latin America was profoundly affected by the reception
of Roman law in the civil-law systems of the continent.
Chattel slavery was an established Roman institution which was not based on
race. Slaves could be educated and could hold responsible positions. Altl10ugh
masters held legal title to assets amassed by slaves, slaves could purchase tl1eir
freedom witl1 tl1ose assets. Freed slaves could become citizens, and their children
were free of restrictions. Unlike Roman slavery, slavery in the Americas was based
on race. That fostered an ideology of racial inferiority which encouraged restrictions on manumission and discrimination against freed slaves. The laws of English
America restricted manumission and discriminated against freed slaves far more
than the laws of tl1e rest of tl1e Americas. Watson argues that the reception of
Roman law explains tl1is difference.
The chapters on the law of slavery in the Americas of Spain, England, France,
Portugal, and Holland are short. For example, tl1e chapter on England and slave
law in America is twenty pages, focusing on Soutl1 Carolina as the representative
state. Watson limits his examination to the legal rules, and he admits it is difficult
to deduce much about a society from an examination of its legal rules. Thus he
avoids tl1e controversy over the actual conditions of slavery in the Americas-tl1e
relative levels of cruelty of masters, relative levels of manumission or relative levels
of racial prejudice. Within the limits he sets, Watson convincingly demonstrates
the Roman law derivation of much of the law of slavery in the Americas.
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Professor Watson is less persuasive in arguing that the reception of Roman law
in England would have made the law of slavery in English America less racist. The
crux of his argument is that because Roman law had a dominant influence on the
laws of slavery in the colonies of the rest of America, "it would be presumptuous
to believe that if Roman law had been received in England, Roman slave law would
not have had a very powerful effect on the law of slavery in the English colonies
and southern states" (p. 127). But that does not prove that the reception ofRoman
law would have affected the law of slavery in the different context of the English
colonies. There are too many other candidates for explaining the differences in
the laws of the different nations in the Americas. The influence of the church in
Latin America, the existence of a poor white majority in English America, and
differences in the social, political and economic traditions of the European nations
may be equally or more important factors than the reception of Roman law.
Courts in English America looked to Roman law for many oftl~e legal pTinciples
they applied. The restrictions on manumission and the limitations on free blacks
were largely products oflegislation rather than of the "legal elite." Under Watson's
tl1eory, government is responding to social forces when it does take an interest in
legal mles. His book does not show how the reception of Roman Jaw alone would
have altered tl10se social forces. What it does show is how the reception of Roman
law affected tl1e law of slavery in the rest of the Americas.
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